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Responding to Global Poverty: Harm, Responsibility, and Agency, Christian Barry and 




For nearly half a century, political theorists have wrestled with the problem of global 
social justice, producing evermore elaborate and analytically sophisticated models, 
but without engaging significantly with, or materially influencing, real-world politics. 
Responding to Global Poverty: Harm, Responsibility, and Agency summarizes this 
discourse very effectively, but without transcending its limits. The actual causes of 
global poverty are barely touched upon, and the “agency” in the subtitle of the book is 
almost exclusively that of the affluent world. The impression remains that those 
seeking answers to the problem of global poverty would be well advised to look 
elsewhere than towards analytical political theory. 
 
 
The modern literature on responding to global poverty is over fifty years old and has attracted 
the attention of some of the most prominent analytical political theorists of the age, including 
Brian Barry, Charles Beitz, Simon Caney, Thomas Pogge, John Rawls, and Peter Singer. Yet 
in spite of this extraordinary concentration of brainpower, the problem of global poverty has 
quite clearly not been solved, or, indeed adequately defined.1 We are therefore entitled to ask 
two questions of any new contribution to this literature: first, what does it have to offer that 
past work does not; and second, what reason is there to think that, this time, it will truly make 
a difference. These questions will be posed below, but before undertaking this task it may be 
useful to offer an overview of the field, with particular attention to why the problem of global 
poverty seems so intractable.2  
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A BACKGROUNDER ON POVERTY AND GLOBAL JUSTICE  
 
This overview must start with Peter Singer’s 1972 essay “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” 
which was one of the first attempts by a political philosopher to address the problem of 
global poverty and inequality. Singer—a radical utilitarian—wrote at the time of the 
Bengaladesh famine, and noted that more money was being spent on projects such as the 
Sydney Opera House than on poverty relief, a situation he regarded as morally wrong. His 
argument was deceptively simple: (1) suffering and death from lack of food and shelter are 
bad; (2) if it is in our power to stop something bad from happening without sacrificing 
anything of comparable moral importance (or, in a weaker version, anything morally 
significant), we ought so to do; and (3) distance is more or less irrelevant, so the fact that the 
death and suffering are taking place on another continent rather than by our back door does 
not affect our duty to act (although it may affect our ability to act). If we spend money on 
things we do not really need—such as opera houses or, for that matter, clothes if the clothes 
we already possess are adequate for the purpose of keeping us warm—we do wrong. This is a 
simple argument and one that many people find compelling, although it does rest on the 
utilitarian principle that all goods are directly comparable and can be handled by the same 
calculus. An interesting feature of Singer’s argument, though, is that although it is often 
thought compelling, it rarely changes behavior; Singer has repeated the argument, with minor 
variations, in a number of publications over the last forty-five years, which is inadvertent 
testimony to how ineffective it actually is in actually getting people to act on the principles he 
defends.3 Interestingly, some of Singer’s arguments on other issues have been effective in the 
real world. For example, I know some people who have become vegetarians or vegans after 
reading his Animal Liberation, but as far as I know, very few have followed through on the 
logic of “Famine, Affluence, and Morality.” Why not? Partly, no doubt, because it is too 
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demanding, but also because Singer’s argument does not provide, or attempt to provide, a 
convincing account of the general context—historical and institutional—of global poverty 
and inequality. Addressing this context is the claim of the discourse of global justice.  
Most Anglo-American theories of justice of the last half century draw on, revise, 
rework, or extend John Rawls’s great work A Theory of Justice, but for theories of 
international justice Rawls’s legacy is, at best, ambiguous. At the center of his theory is the 
proposition that the outlines of a just society emerge from a social contract, entered into 
under ideal conditions, which produces (first) political equality and (second) the “difference 
principle,” which states that economic and social inequalities are just if and only if such 
inequalities work to the benefit of the least advantaged members of the society.4 This latter 
qualification is a challenging requirement that, if adopted, would require all existing societies 
to undergo radical change; and the debate among theorists of domestic social justice revolves 
around the question of whether this change is radical enough or, alternatively, whether it 
ought to be based on different principles (such as, for example, radical egalitarianism). 
However, Rawls’s account of international justice produces a different discourse, because he 
argues that the contract that would be agreed upon by just societies coming together to create 
a just international society would be limited to the equivalent of political equality—that is, 
sovereign equality under the rule of international law—and, crucially, would not include the 
equivalent of an international “difference principle.”  
From the outset, critics have resisted this position. If there is a pressing need to justify 
inequalities in domestic society, then surely it is perverse to suggest that international 
inequalities do not require justification. But that, indeed, is Rawls’s position, reiterated in a 
late work, The Law of Peoples. He argues that well-ordered members of the society of 
peoples have a duty to assist those societies that are currently incapable, for one reason or 
another, of meeting the criteria for membership to reach the necessary level of political and 
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social development, but this duty to assist is not a cosmopolitan principle, and inequality 
within the society of peoples is not necessarily problematic.5 International society is, on his 
account, not the kind of society that is based on a cooperative scheme for mutual advantage; 
there is no global demos and there is no basis for a principle of distributive justice. Various 
arguments against this position have been presented over the years, ranging from the idea that 
there should be an initial contract to see if contractors are willing to accept the idea of 
separate societies, and if so, on what terms;6 to changes in the assumptions made about what 
societies would agree to under ideal conditions;7 to an alternative perspective rejecting the 
idea of mutual advantage altogether.8 Arguments for global justice have rested on the 
implications of the Kantian Categorical Imperative9 or on the neo-Marxist argument that the 
poverty of the poor is a by-product of the wealth of the rich, and that those who currently 
benefit from the history of imperialism are obligated to make things right for those who have 
been its victims.10  
In sum, theories of global justice have become more and more complex over the 
decades, but they have one thing in common with the earliest critiques of Rawls, and that is 
that they have had more or less no effect on real-world politics. The case can be made that 
there is less real poverty in the world today than one or two decades ago (more on this 
below), but insofar as this is the case, it is because of the workings of the world economy 
and, in particular, the development of China and (to a lesser extent) India, and not because of 
the success of philosophical arguments in favor of global equality. 
Why this apparent impotence? Thomas Nagel offers one explanation: theories of 
global justice invariably involve the need to coordinate the activities of large numbers of 
people, which in turn requires the existence of government. Global justice theorists despair of 
the possibility of world government and hope to achieve their objectives instead via a 
commitment to “moral cosmopolitanism,” but such a commitment is impotent in the face of 
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the implications of actually trying to think of the world as constituting a single society.11 
There is, perhaps, a wider point here, made by a school of thought sometimes termed the 
“new political realism.” In a key statement, “Realism and Moralism in Political Theory,” 
Bernard Williams critiqued two accounts of the relationship between politics and ethics.12 
First, he identifies the enactment model whereby principles, concepts, ideals, and values are 
formulated in theory, and politics is given the task of enacting what has been formulated, 
using persuasion or by exercising power. Utilitarian thought such as that of Singer often takes 
this form. Then he outlines the structural model where theory lays down the conditions under 
which power can be justly exercised. Unlike the enactment model, this account of morality 
does not directly tell us what politics must achieve, but rather sets constraints on what politics 
can rightly do. Both Rawls and his critics adopt this approach. In both of these models the 
moral is prior to the political. Williams terms this political moralism and contrasts it 
unfavorably with political realism, which acknowledges the need to secure order as the first 
unavoidable, political question. This sounds Hobbesian, but Williams outlines the “basic 
legitimation demand,” which is that order be secured in a way that is acceptable to all; with 
or without this proviso we are back to the need for government, and to the truth of Rawls’s 
and Nagel’s insight that without government social justice is impossible: moral 
cosmopolitanism does not provide the basis for a system of global justice. 
 
WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?  
 
Given the problems with the discourse outlined above, where does this new offering by 
Christian Barry and Gerhard Øverland stand? The first thing to be said about Responding to 
Global Poverty is that it is presented in the manner of contemporary analytical political 
theory. This does not mean that the argument is difficult to understand, but it does mean that 
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it is squarely geared toward current and aspiring analytical political theorists. Terms are 
rigorously defined; a distinction is made between “assistance-based responsibilities” (for 
example, Singer’s argument that if you can help you should) and “contribution-based 
responsibilities” (for example, Thomas Pogge’s claim that the current rich benefit from the 
past and present exploitation of the current poor), and narrow distinctions are drawn between 
doing harm, allowing harm to be done, and enabling harm. Similarly, the costs of action are 
classified and defined. A great deal of this analysis is not directly related to global justice; for 
example, the extended discussion of the distinction between doing, allowing, and enabling 
harm and the defense of the unusual distinction between the latter two categories is 
conducted by reference to the extensive philosophical literature on the difference between 
killing and letting die rather than with direct reference to global poverty or inequality. Still, 
the aim is that, when these distinctions have been clarified, the analysis will illuminate the 
claims made by Pogge and others, and this aim is, indeed, achieved. Parts I and II, dealing 
respectively with assistance-based and contribution-based responsibilities, present a concise 
and well-organized account of the debate on global justice as it has developed over the 
decades, and will be particularly valuable to student readers as well as those members of the 
general public who are prepared to go along with the uncompromising style of 
argumentation.  
Less valuable, in my opinion, is the extensive use of hypothetical cases in order to 
develop the argument. Thus, for example, Pogge’s claim that we are harming the poor if we 
impose an unjust institutional order upon them—unjust insofar as there is a feasible 
alternative institutional arrangement that would not harm the poor—is explored via a series of 
scenarios covering the hypothetical terms of trade between Earth and Venus rather than by 
investigating actual World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations. Such reasoning is, of 
course, not unusual; Singer’s original article set out the now famous hypothetical case 
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concerning the obligations of a passerby who observes that a child is drowning in a shallow 
pool, and who could save her without sacrificing something of comparable (or perhaps any) 
moral significance. However, this example was purely illustrative, set in a much wider 
discursive framework and not crucial to the argument. Barry and Øverland, on the other hand, 
actually develop their argument by offering a great many such hypotheticals. 
This approach relies for its persuasive power on our possessing moral intuitions that 
tell us how we should behave when faced with a hypothetical case. The most famous such 
case, known commonly as the “Trolley Problem,” asks whether, in the event we see a train 
threatening to run into and kill a group of half a dozen people (who for some reason cannot 
move), we should throw into its path a handy overweight individual whose size would bring 
the train to a stop at the cost of his life.13 If, in fact, as I believe, our moral intuitions have 
been shaped over time by our encounters with real, as opposed to fanciful, situations, then 
such cases are of limited value. I have some moral intuitions about how to behave toward 
someone who is behaving badly or well toward me, but—and here I am speaking for myself, 
readers may disagree—I have no moral intuitions about what I should do if faced with the 
Trolley Problem. Runaway trains are not a problem I have encountered in my journey 
through life, and I have never had to decide between sacrificing one life or allowing six to 
die; as a result I do not have relevant intuitions to bring to the table. The simplicity of these 
fanciful cases is supposed to clarify; whereas, by omitting all the nuances, histories, and 
emotions that accompany actual decisions, such simplicity more plausibly serves to 
obfuscate. 
Returning to matters of substance, it is in Part III of Responding to Global Poverty, 
titled “Implications of Contribution,” that the distinctions among doing, allowing, and 
enabling harm are employed to take the argument into less familiar, and potentially 
controversial, territory. The key issue here concerns the extent to which the harm done by the 
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rich world’s imposition of the current, allegedly unjust, global institutional structure on the 
poor world could justify the use of force in self-defense by the latter against the former. Barry 
and Øverland reject the proposition that tariffs and subsidies imposed by the rich that 
contribute to deaths from poverty-related causes constitute killing, but they argue that such 
policies do more than simply allow avoidable deaths; rather, they enable them. In a striking 
statistic, —albeit a statistic arrived at by some heroic, and perhaps implausible, 
assumptions—they assert that the 2.2 billion people who they define as constituting the rich 
of the world contribute to the death of 3.65 million children every year, or, to put it another 
way, any group of 602 affluent people contributes to the death of one child each year (p. 
177). Much of Part III of the book is devoted to exploring, and for the most part dismissing, 
the various arguments that might be put forward to avoid the implication that the poor have a 
right of resistance in the face of this situation. Many of these arguments again draw upon the 
contemporary literature on “revisionist” just war theory, dealing with matters such as the 
rights of “innocents,” the relationship between individual and collective responsibility, and so 
on.14 Clearly, these are arguments with implications that go a long way beyond what are 
usually thought of as the problems of global poverty, and I take it that part of the purpose of 
the book is to persuade the reader that phenomena such as terrorism and asymmetric war 
cannot be understood except in the wider context of global inequality. 
The authors make a strong case for their position, and it is provocative and worthy of 
consideration. Nevertheless, I see reasons for caution. The first and most obvious point is that 
it is not quite as clear as the authors assume that the existing global international structure 
works to disadvantage the poor, at least not to the extent that their arguments rely upon. 
Certainly, there are some practices legitimized under WTO rules that hurt the poor—such as 
subsidies to European and American agriculture—but it is also the case that over the last two 
decades very large numbers of people have been lifted out of poverty by trade conducted 
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under WTO rules. Scholars such as Paul Collier argue that some five billion people have 
been or are being lifted out of poverty by the forces unleashed by globalization and 
institutionalized in bodies such as the International Monetary Fund and the WTO. The most 
important issue now, he argues, is how to handle the “bottom billion” who have been left 
behind.15 Others will have a more jaundiced view of the current global institutional order, but 
the key point is that by refusing to do more than occasionally nibble at the surface of the very 
large amount of empirical literature on global poverty and development, the impression is 
given that the causes of global poverty are now so well established that they do not merit 
further consideration. This is not the case. 
 
WHOSE AGENCY IS IT ANYWAY? 
 
Perhaps a more important reason to be cautious about the way in which the authors set out 
their argument concerns the issue of agency. The subtitle of Responding to Global Poverty is 
Harm, Responsibility, and Agency, but the agency in question is solely that of the globally 
affluent. The authors explicitly tell us throughout the book that their focus is on children 
precisely to avoid the issue of the agency of the poor: “[children], at least, cannot plausibly 
be viewed as in any way responsible for their plight” (p. 175). Singer’s “child in the shallow 
pool” case is, again, chosen for the same reason: we do not need to ask why the child is in the 
pool. But the global poor collectively are not children, to be deemed incapable of exercising 
responsibility, and it may well be that the innocent children of poverty have a better case 
against their own parents than against the globally affluent. It is clear that corruption, 
political violence, and, generally, bad policy are responsible for many of the problems of the 
poorest countries, especially of Collier’s bottom billion; and it is also clear that most theorists 
of global justice are aware that this is so and are nevertheless unwilling to build this 
 10 
awareness into their theories. Instead, it is more common to explain failures of governance in 
poor countries as either beyond their control or actually created by the rich. 
Consider, for example, the so-called “resource curse,” which inflicts authoritarian 
governments on countries unlucky enough to possess the kind of raw material endowment 
that enables their leaders to rule without the level of popular consent that would be required 
were they to be financed via an effective tax system—a curse that is made operative by the 
willingness of the wealthy to buy from dictators.16 The point I want to make here is not that 
the resource curse does not exist, but that the key intervening variable between raw materials 
and authoritarian government is political culture. Thus, North Sea oil has not destroyed 
Norwegian democracy but rather has made possible the most generous welfare state on the 
planet, whereas the hundreds of billions of dollars in oil revenues that have accrued to 
Nigeria over the decades have gone into the pockets of a fabulously wealthy elite. Of all the 
writers on global justice of the last four decades, only John Rawls in his account of the duties 
of assistance of well-ordered peoples toward the inhabitants of “burdened societies” gives 
adequate stress to the importance of developing the kind of political culture that would make 
material wealth a blessing rather than a curse.17 Rawls perhaps goes too far in suggesting that 
transfers of wealth are never required, but his basic perspective is better supported by the 
empirical data on development and aid than is the work of most of his cosmopolitan critics. 
Barry and Øverland explore the possibility that the global poor might properly and 
defensively use force against the globally affluent, but in the real world there is little 
possibility that such force could be effective in changing policy, whether morally justified or 
not. Rhetorical flourishes aside, terrorism, most of which, in any case, is not generated by 
poverty, does not constitute an existential threat to any rich country and historically has never 
produced the kind of reorientation that the authors think necessary.  
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In sum, this book has great value as an overview of the global justice literature and as 
a rigorous exposition of the key categories involved in doing, allowing, and enabling harm. 
Students of the field or, for that matter, nonstudents who want to know what political theory 
has to offer on the subject of global poverty, will find Responding to Global Poverty 
invaluable; no better summary of what analytical political theory has to offer is available. But 
as well as illustrating the best that political theory has to offer, this book also reveals its 
limits. In shaping our response to global poverty we certainly need the insights of normative 
political theory, but we also need to be sensitive to the empirical findings and theoretical 
insights of development economics, political sociology, and international relations. 
Integrating these various discourses into a coherent approach is a difficult task, but  Barry 
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